

Gestalt and the Poet's Self in John Keats's “Hyperion” and “The Fall of Hyperion”

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Abstract

In “Hyperion” and “The Fall of Hyperion,” John Keats, with his negative capability, displays both gestalt and his own self in three aspects (1) the significance of beauty: unlike many other critics, he regards beauty as containing both pleasure and pain, while this unique assertion marks his own individuality; (2) the description of a poet's identity: rejecting a fixed identity, he assumes multiple roles, and (3) the presentation of the fall of the Titans: he rewrites Greek mythology by presenting them as suffering together, not as wandering alone separately. Although gestalt exalts the “whole” above the “part” in importance, and Keats also negates the identity of a poet, yet his own peculiar self is still clearly revealed.

Keywords: John Keats, Negative Capability, Hyperion, Gestalt, Self.

「格式塔」與「詩人自我」於濟慈〈海皮里昂〉 及〈海皮里昂之衰亡〉二詩中之展現

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摘要

在〈海皮里昂〉及〈海皮里昂之衰亡〉中，濟慈以其「否定能力」(negative capability)在三方面展現了「格式塔」(gestalt)與其「詩人自我」：(一)「美」之重要性：和許多其他論者主張不同，濟慈認為「美」是「力量」，包含了「悲」與「喜」，然而如此主張，卻更彰顯他獨特的自我；(二)詩人身分：「否定能力」使詩人拒絕固定身分，從而扮演多種角色；(三)對「泰坦」(Titans)受苦的描寫：濟慈改編希臘神話，描繪他們選擇一起受苦，而非各自漂流。雖然濟慈宣稱詩人「沒有自我」，且「格式塔」重「全局」更勝於「個人」，可是他的「自我」依然鮮明。

關鍵詞：濟慈、否定能力、海皮里昂、格式塔、自我。

I. Introduction

John Keats yearns for "negative capability," an ability shown "when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason [W]ith a great poet the sense of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all consideration" ("Letter to George and Tom" 109). This yearning, like Thoreau's affirmation that "all good things are wild and free" ("Walking"), matches our general understanding of romantic thinking that opposes to "rational thought, analytical precision, and systematic speculation" in favor of "passionate sensibility, human and humanitarian warmth, and lifelike confusion" (Simpson 2). Such a capability enables him to seek beauty and differentiates essentially his achievement from those of neoclassical poets and of his contemporary arch-romantics. He rejects the neoclassical poetics of Alexander Pope, who affirms the necessity of following Nature, imitating the Greco-Roman poets, and relying on reason. For Keats, "beauty" is the ultimate goal for great poets, while "fact and reason" only prevent them from achieving that goal. Moreover, negative capability isolates Keats from the other arch-Romantic poets in its demonstration in "uncertainties, mysteries, [and] doubts." William Blake proposes that "man brings all that he has or can have into the world himself" (408); William Wordsworth defines good poetry as "the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings" (438) and a poet as "the rock defense for human nature" (442); Samuel Taylor Coleridge asserts that the secondary imagination of a poet "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate" ("Biographia" 478); George Gordon Byron creates the dynamic, moody, passionate "Byronic heroes" in his own image; Percy Bysshe Shelley glorifies poets as "the institutors of laws, and the founders of civil society, and the inventors of the arts of life, and the teachers" (517)—all these mark the distinctive identities of those romantic poets. Yet Keats intends to negate his presence in his poetry. His seemingly absurd utterance—"Do I wake or sleep?" ("Ode to a Nightingale" 80)—not only exemplifies his negative capability but also "obliterates all consideration" about a powerful poet.

Thence, with his negative capability, Keats speaks with the most selfless voice among the English romantic poets. Indeed, this capability echoes the ideal of ecocriticism in the rejection of the privileged status of human beings and self-centered ideology. For Keats, "self annihilation (sic.) and disappearance"—the manifestation of negative capability—form the basis of his dynamic art, especially when he rewrote "Hyperion: A Fragment" into "The Fall of Hyperion: A Dream" (Wawrzinek 431). On the other hand, with regard to the eco-friendly discourse, despite its various names—by the 1970s, it was called "deep ecology"; in the 1980s

and 1990s, “ecocentrism” or “biocentrism” became the generally recognized terms—yet the basic idea remains: “the moral equivalence of humans and nonhuman nature” (Woodhouse). Ecocritics may all agree with the proposal of the Earth First! movement that the large parts of the Earth must be isolated from “industrial human civilization,” and that “[h]uman beings are not dominant, Earth is not for *Homo sapiens* alone, human life is but one life form on the planet and has no right to take exclusive possession” (Woodhouse). The critique of anthropocentrism never vanishes in ecocriticism.

Nevertheless, ecocriticism, far from being synthesized into a consistent, homogenous discourse, is still developing with “complex disciplinary debates” (Hajer 65). Næss, the founder of deep ecology, affirms that interpretations of his theoretical “principles” may vary “from place to place and from person to person,” and that one may cultivate one’s own “ecosophy¹” that will always be changing with one’s own life (Drengson “Introduction”). He even proposes that one must “avoid looking for one definite philosophy or religious view among the supporters of the deep ecology movement” since this movement embraces diverse worldviews (“The Basics”)—a proposal similar to “negative capability” in recognizing “uncertainties” in discourse. In addition, environmental criticism “cannot (at least not yet) claim the methodological originality that was injected into literary studies . . .” (Buell, *Future*). There may be “a cluster of challenging intellectual work” rather than “a single titanic book or figure” (Buell, *Future*). Ecocriticism “makes possible a literary appreciation and creation that is local and global, where there is no one dominant story. It is where we can better appreciate our Earth’s great gift of diversity and pluralism of worldviews, spiritual ways, arts and personal philosophies” (Drengson 21). In ecocriticism, consequently, there is no “meta-narrative”² attacked by Lyotard (xxiv; Malpas 24). Therefore, I do not treat my discussion as exclusively “ecocentric” even though I adopt some terms related to environmental studies³, nor do I aim at

¹ This term, coined by Næss, refers to “a philosophical world-view or system inspired by the conditions of life in the ecosphere” (*Ecology* 36-37).

² It refers to the discourse which determines the validity of all the other discourses (Malpas 24). The most remarkable examples are “Enlightenment reason” and “Marxism.”

³ In the title I use “self,” not “anthropocentrism”—a term which may render my discussion more “ecocritical.” Rather, the presence or absence of self is more significant when we consider Keats’s management of negative capability. Anthropocentrism, probably the most discussed and despised concept in ecocriticism and environmental literature, usually projects a world “understood according to our own scale, dimensions, interests and desire” (Clark, *Cambridge*). It holds that “humans and their existence is superior to and more important than any other entity in the world” (Rangarajan). It assumes the priority of human interests to that of nonhumans as well (Buell, *Future*); “only humans are valuable in and of themselves and that nonhumans possess only instrumental value” (Tirosh-Samuels), and only in relation to human beings can nonhumans acquire value (Clark, *Value*). Therefore, anthropocentrism is always the target of ecocriticism or environmentalism. Keats cannot be labelled as “anthropocentric” since he is not guilty of exploiting and

highlighting some essential differences among the branches of ecocriticism.

I intend to discuss Keats's artistry of negative capability in three aspects—(1) the significance of beauty, (2) the identity of a poet, and (3) the presentation of the fall of the Titans—by illustrating in his *Hyperion* poems the presence of "self" and "gestalt," "the relational, total-field image" (Næss, *Ecology* 28; Næss, "Shallow" 95; Rangarajan), a concept similar to "the hermeneutical circle." Ecologists explore "human relationship with other species and with the world around us" (Meeker 3-4) just as hermeneutic philosophers hold the mutual dependence of parts and whole: "By dialectical interaction between the whole and the part, each gives the other meaning; understanding is circular" (Palmer 87). All beings, including mankind, are "relationally defined parts of a larger whole," and gestalt, "the basic and immediate form of understanding and perception—is a spontaneous experience of the whole" (Rangarajan). Though negative capability means to deny the presence of self, its demonstration paradoxically marks the individual voice of John Keats at the same time. Self-expression and gestalt tend to be mutually exclusive—the former essentially emphasizes more on one's own individuality than on the priority of the "whole" and the interdependence of all beings—but with negative capability, Keats displays both in his *Hyperion* poems.

II. The Significance of Beauty

A. Keats's peculiar interpretation of beauty

Beauty, not nature, is the ultimate ideal for Keats, "the disciple of truth and beauty" (Simpson 9): Nature may inspire a poet ("Ode to a Nightingale," "I stood tip-toe upon a little hill," "To Autumn"), but such an inspiration also comes from art ("Ode on a Grecian Urn," "On first looking into Chapman's Homer"), Greek mythology ("Ode to Psyche," "Ode to Apollo," the two *Hyperion* poems) and heroic deeds ("Specimen of an Induction to a Poem," "To Kosciusko"). While writing "Endymion," Keats gradually elaborates his ideas about beauty: it is venerated as universal, transcendental so that the limitations of the mundane world can be conquered (Coote 77). The glorification of beauty abounds in Keats's poetry: "A thing of beauty is a joy forever" ("Endymion" 1.1); "Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all / Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know" ("Ode on a Grecian Urn" 49-50). Art for Keats can "evaporate" all disagreeable elements and associate them with beauty and truth ("Letter to George and Tom" 109). Ecocriticism, on the other hand, holds "an egalitarian perspective with respect to all elements of nature and acknowledges the intrinsic value of all living beings"

dominating Nature with the premise that human beings exist as the source of all values, nor does he claim for "the priority of human interests to that of nonhumans."

(Rangarajan). The “intrinsic value of all living beings” in Keats’s poetry is beauty.

In his *Hyperion* poems, Keats characterizes beauty as “might.” Heaven and Earth are beautiful (H. 2. 206-9)⁴, while their indifference to Saturn brings affliction (H. 1.55-56). In other words, Heaven and Earth exist as the supreme, transcendental power in the universe. Long time ago, Titans drove out Darkness because they were more beautiful than it; now a rising power—that is, the Olympians— “more strong (sic.) in beauty” will be “fated” to excel them (H. 2. 212-25). Clymene has witnessed Apollo’s power in a brilliant image (H. 2. 279-89). Mnemosyne, leaving the Titans, feels attracted by Apollo’s “loveliness” (H. 3. 79). Oceanus points out that the Olympians surpass Titans in “beauty,” and “’tis the eternal law / That first in beauty should be first in might” (H. 2. 228-29); he even admits “a glow of beauty” in Poseidon’s eyes so that he yields sea to the Olympian (H. 2.237-39). The Titans have been suppressed “by an unheralded force in the universe, whose beauty is not only its truth but its power” (Stewart 146). “Beauty” is usually not linked with “power” in common sense. Burke points out that “delicacy” and “fragility” are essential to beauty—“without any remarkable appearance of strength.” The perception of beauty as “might,” not found in Hesiod’s *Theogony* and alien to Burke’s judgment, is purely Keatsian, and conveys his unusual judgment of beauty. His recognition of beauty as the universal truth also marks his peculiar aesthetic taste.

Nonetheless, this Keatsian description of beauty appears “uncertain” and inconsistent—perhaps under the impact of negative capability. Thea’s face is hailed as more “beautiful” than “Beauty’s self” (H. 1. 35-36) because of her sorrow. Yet this remarkable beauty does not strengthen her, and her image as a weeping female appears quite pathetic. Besides, Hyperion, though declining in his power, appears among the Titans with glory; his splendor pervades everywhere (H. 2. 257-66)—powerful like Nature. Yet he sighs even in his glory as “the dejected King of Day” (H. 2. 380). The title, “The Fall of Hyperion,” indicates the inevitability of his decline, but his glory shows no sign of deterioration at all. The cases of Thea and Hyperion contradicts Keats’s affirmation of beauty as might.

Keats quests for beauty with negative capability; in other words, the presence of the poet in the glorification of beauty must be denied or at least minimalized. However, “in saying it is *beautiful* and in showing that I have taste, I am concerned, not with that in which I depend on the existence of the object, but with that which I make out of this representation in myself”; “Beauty only concerns men” (Kant). The judgment of something as beautiful always

⁴ For the convenience of discussion, in the identification of the sources, “H” stands for “Hyperion,” while “FH,” “The Fall of Hyperion.”

presupposes the existence of a judge. The feeling of the subject (human beings) is the determining ground for the judgment of something as beautiful. The determination of something as beautiful is purely subjective. Therefore, despite his effort to negate his own presence, his glorification of beauty manifests a Keatsian voice. He insists on the right of being a poet:

. . . Who alive can say,
"Thou art no Poet may'st not tell thy dreams?"
Since every man whose soul is not a clod
Hath visions, and would speak, if he had loved
And been well nurtured in his mother tongue. (FH. 1. 11-15)

This is Keats's declaration of independence as a mature poet. His "dreams" and "visions" convey nothing but beauty, and this unique declaration highlights his poetic self as well—this "self" can reveal the mystery of beauty; nowadays, Keats is known as a poet closely associated with beauty.

Owing to his unique depictions of beauty, consequently, the poet's presence becomes all the more extraordinary. Mountains and rivers cannot declare themselves beautiful, and only human beings can bestow such a judgment on nonhumans. His praise of beauty marks nothing but the Keatsian taste—a strong presence that must be "privileged" in our understanding of his poetry, and that requires readers to notice *his* particularity. "Self" is negated but undeniably present.

B. Beauty and Gestalt

Beauty anticipates some form of association or relationships. "A thing of beauty" exerts its influence on human beings, and this beauty comes into being only when shown to human beings. Likewise, the claim that beauty and truth are the same presumes the existence of some addressees, who recognize the beauty of the Grecian urn in their meditation on it. The Titans judge the Olympians "beautiful"—the judgment of someone or something as "beautiful" always takes for granted the connection between the addresser and the addressee(s), while this connection indicates the existence of a context, an environment. The recognition of the interconnection echoes the premise of deep ecology, which discards "the man-in-environment image in favor of the relational, total-field image" (Næss, "Shallow" 95). No Titan denies the beauty and might of the Olympians; with this "consensus," they are "united" in their appreciation of this "beauty." In short, beauty does not exist for its own sake, and it always posits the existence of relationship: a thing or a being is beautiful for someone, and without this

“someone,” beauty does not make any sense.

In gestalt, a poet must see the whole, not simply a part. This also agrees with the ideal of ecocriticism. Leopold defines ecology as “the science of communities” and coins the term “ecological conscience” to mean “the ethics of community” (340). Ecological thought actually embraces darkness and lightness, negativity and positivity (Morton). The whole context definitely includes contradictory elements, and any attempt to eliminate them will ruin the context. In his description of beauty, Keats usually embraces contradictory feelings and often uses oxymorons. Through negative capability, Keats “feels not only the pleasure but also the pain of human existence” (Pfahl 451). Apollo can play the tune of “pain and pleasure” simultaneously and thus move the whole universe (H. 3. 66). Clymene hears in Apollo’s “golden melody” a “living death in each gush of sounds,” and so is “sick / Of joy and grief at once” (H. 2. 279-89). She feels pains when hearing sweet voices announcing “[t]he morning-bright Apollo” (H. 2. 292-97). Negative capability rejects rational certainty and truth, while beauty can never be mastered by the limited power of reason. The frequent use of oxymoron, especially the coexistence of pain and pleasure in beauty, testifies to Keats’s awareness of “gestalt,” the panorama of human experiences: “Every sole man hath days of joy and pain” (FH 1.172); the poetical character “enjoys light, and shade” (“Letter to Richard Woodhouse” 295) since the “negative ability” refers to “an unforced openness to the full range of experience, to pain as well as pleasure” (Coote 16). Beauty, in short, associates mutually contradictory elements so as to present the “whole” spectrum of human experiences.

Nevertheless, Keats’s preference to “oxymoronic” essence of beauty, the combination of pain and pleasure, simultaneously highlights his matchless style and taste. For many other critics, beauty mainly brings pleasure. For Burke, beauty means the quality that may “cause love, or some passion similar to it”; “the appearance of beauty as effectually causes some degree of love in us”—it is always associated with pleasure. For Kant, the beautiful brings the feeling of pleasure. For Coleridge, pleasure always accompanies the judgment of beauty (“Principles” 475). A poet, who claims no identity for himself, should have followed Burke, Kant, and Coleridge in aesthetic judgment. Thus, negative capability does not eliminate his individual voice; rather, it exposes his particular voice all the more clearly. His negative capability contributes to an incomparable aesthetic view, which marks nothing but his distinctive taste. After all, “the nature of Romanticism” lies in “the obsession with the self and with self-consciousness” (Simpson 10). The insistence on “self,” directly or indirectly, characterizes all the major Romantic poets. Keats consciously proclaims to reject the self in theory, but unconsciously displays it in practice.

A poet with negative capability must reveal beauty to all the living beings. Keats compares the image of beauty to "the rise, the progress, the setting of imagery" of the sun ("Letter to John Taylor" 128)—that is, the impact of beauty must be universally felt and nourish all the world. Beauty connects both the poet and his readers, and consequently forms a "relational, total-field image"—this can be treated as another "might" of beauty, a power that can save all beings from self-alienation and isolation. Thus, he anticipates the ecocritical ideal which asserts the necessity of the connection of all beings. This ideal, also called "gestalt," is found in Keats's demonstrations of the poet's identity and of the Titans in his two Hyperion poems.

III. The Poet's Identity

A. A man speaking to men

An ideal poet for Keats must build and maintain a close relationship with others: he is "a sage; / A humanist, physician to all men" (FH. 1. 189-90). The "great end" of poesy "should be a friend / To sooth the cares, and life the thoughts of man" ("Sleep and Poetry" 246-47). In other words, a poet, far from living in isolation, must contribute to the welfare of others and pour out "balm upon the world" (FH. 1. 201). Negative capability is "a capacity for transcending the self" (Pfahl 453) so as to befriend the others. He reveals beauty to his readers, and consequently connects all of them with beauty. It illustrates the importance of "gestalt" in Keats's artistry. The longing for company stems from Keats's staying with Leigh Hunt's circle (Coote 53), and "company" is indispensable for his negative capability (Coote 116).

In this light, both Hyperion poems present the would-be poet and Apollo (an ideal model for poet) not as solitary suffering heroes, but as the ones who receive revelation from Mnemosyne and Moneta respectively. The "revelation" of the poetical truth occurs through dialogue in a certain context. A hero, who wanders lonely as a cloud, or who meditates alone with *weltschmerz*, does not appeal to Keats. Revelation does not come from meditation, but from the interaction with other beings—a situation that presumes the existence of a context, a "whole." This revelation differs from the inspiration of Muses prayed by Hesiod and some epic poets: their inspiration comes from the nine sisters, without any dialogue between them and the poets, who receives the divine voices and is required to convey the divine message. By contrast, Keats delineates the revelation as dialogues, while the would-be poet and Apollo can speak with their own voices. Such a dialogic relationship contributes to a gestalt scene. Mnemosyne, the goddess of memory, stirs the poetic creativity by associating the past and the

present. She feels attracted by Apollo's "loveliness new born" (H. 3.79) and then comes to inspire him, while he can learn "[a] wondrous lesson in [her] silent face" (H. 3. 112). This bilateral impact differs from the Muses' inspiration of some epic poets—it is incredible for Homer to influence the Muses. Keats brings the cultural "past"—Greek mythology—to his readers with his own rewriting. He "struggles with a sense of his own inadequacy to translate the Greek myth into effective poetic form in a contemporary world of misery, heartbreak and challenging political change" (Webb 153). Later on, "[k]nowledge enormous" is poured into Apollo's brain (H. 3. 113-17), and he drinks "bright elixir peerless" so that he becomes immortal (H. 3. 118-20). So enormous is the knowledge of the cultural past that he is almost overwhelmed to death, and this death-like experience brings him a new life as a poet with negative capability. On the other hand, Moneta responds to the "good will" of the would-be poet and determines to show him her power (FH. 2.242-44). Later on, the appearance of Moneta moves him to cry out his resolution to be a poet: "Let me behold, according as thou saidst, / What in thy brain so ferments to and fro" (FH. 1.289-90). He even aspires to set himself "[u]pon an eagle's watch, that [he] might see" (FH. 1.309)—in other words, to gain a panoramic view, a gestalt vision. The interaction between the source(s) of poetic artistry (Mnemosyne and Moneta) and the poets builds up a relational picture for creation and initiates a gestalt view toward the world.

B. The uncertainty and diversity of a poet's role(s)

Negative capability demands a poet to remain in "uncertainties." Thus, dream and sleep prevail in Keats's poetry. Before receiving the vision, the speaker in "The Fall of Hyperion" falls down and sleeps because of "the cloudy swoon" after he has tasted some "transparent juice" (1.42-57). "Poesy alone can tell her dreams" and can save imagination "from the sable charm / And dumb enchantment" (FH. 1.8-11). Only a "dreamer" or a visionary can enter Moneta's temple; an ideal poet is not a realist. On the one hand, it seems to deny the poet's identity. Mature Keats hates "Egotist" and "will have no more of Wordsworth or Hunt in particular" ("Letter to John Hamilton Reynolds" 121-22) since both insistently display their identities. "A Poet [. . .] has no Identity—he is continually in for—and for filling some other Body—The Sun, the Moon, the Sea and Men and Women who are creatures of impulse are poetical and have about them an unchangeable attribute—the poet has none; no identity . . ." ("Letter to Richard Woodhouse" 295). Keats wrote this letter when composing "Hyperion," and his declaration echoes Burke's argument that "men are used to talk of beauty in a figurative manner . . . in a manner extremely uncertain, and indeterminate."

On the other hand, this call for "no identity" actually anticipates the poet's ability to perform various roles in creation—that is, it renounces a fixed, unchanged identity. His poetical character "is everything, and nothing—it has no character" ("Letter to Richard Woodhouse" 295); "Men of Genius are great as certain ethereal Chemicals operating on the Mass of neutral intellect—by they have not any individuality, any determined Character" ("Letter to Benjamin Bailey" 102). He describes the ideal poet:

'Tis the man who with a man
Is an equal, be he king,
Or poorest of the beggar clan,
Or any other wondrous thing
A man may be 'twixt ape and Plato. ("Fragment" 3-7).

In her revelation, Moneta affirms that "poetic truth is antithetical to the assertion of self" (Wawrzinek 440). Therefore, in his description of the negative capability, Keats indicates that Shakespeare possesses such a capability in abundance ("Letter to George and Tom" 109). In other words, a poet is expected to compose like a dramatist, who can present a variety of characters without imposing his/her personality on them—"to negate one's own personality, project oneself into the thoughts and feelings of others, and remain open to a variety of points of view" (Lau 84). Keats left both *Hyperion* poems unfinished, a fact that "becomes the means of the poet's self-abandonment, a loss of coherent subjectivity that enables a new form of human identity formed around that loss" (Mulrooney 256). A poet "must first be nothing" in order to embrace everything—the "negative" that engenders the "capability" (Castellano 33). The "negative" implies "not a rejection, a minus or an absence, but rather a sympathetic receptive intensity" (Coote 115). "Keats conceives the self as fluid, unbounded, decentered, inconsistent"; Keats's self "has no [fixed] Identity" (Mellor 216). Consequently, he can assume "the characteristics of other entities and ideas as an actor would"; therefore, negative capability can be defined as "the ability to become which one is not" (Pfahl 454). His poetry is therefore "essentially dramatic. . . . Keats does not come forward in his own person in any direct way; he merely presents or narrates. Even in the lyrics, a form in which by definition and convention the author directly expresses his own feelings and reactions, Keats often remains in the background" (Perkins 196). The poet becomes more productive as the speaking subject dissipates (Wawrzinek 433). This mind with negative capability can restructure ossified meanings and receive various ideas (Castellano 23-24). The creative process for Keats "begins with a desire for self-fulfillment and a psychological openness that

enables the poet to experience other people and objects by assuming their characteristics (what Keats terms ‘negative capability’)” (Pfahl 451); “the poet is always an other (sic.)” (Wawrzinek 436).

In terms of ecologism, this does not eliminate the selfhood of the poet, but enriches and vivifies it. Deep ecology envisages “a relational understanding of selfhood . . . based on active identification with wider and wider circles of being” (Mathews 221). A poet must define his/her own identity in relation to the others—that is, in a context—and the significance of his/her existence emerges only when he/she is connected with the others⁵. Keats describes a poet as “a sage,” “[a] humanist,” and a “physician” (FH 1. 189-90). This stemmed from his dissatisfaction with the contemporary Christian teaching that treats endurance in sufferings as unavoidable; consequently, he cultivated his belief that a poet’s responsibility lies in the soothing of cares of human beings (Coote, “Preface” ix). This fulfills the premise of ecology assumes the relationship among life forms as the basis of various green reform movements (Worster); all beings are interconnected, and this interconnection determines their identities (Morton). Keats must agree with deep ecologists that “as humans, we have obligations, primarily toward suffering humans, but also toward nonhuman beings” (Næss, “Spinoza and the Deep Ecology Movement”). The significance of the poet as a sage/humanist/physician can only come into being when he sympathizes with the suffering of others. Without this “sympathy”—the connection between the poet and the others—the multiple identities of a poet mean nothing. Therefore, Keats’s awareness of “gestalt” bestows meaning on his multiple identities. “The poet is authorized in this self-effacing yet self-realizing effort” (Kissane 73). The “uncertainties” that nourish Keats’s creativity reveal his “identity” most clearly when he intends to deny it.

The multiplicity of the poet’s identities leads to the multiple interpretations of his work as well. A poet’s ability “for experiencing and expressing multiplicity was directly related to his success” (Pfahl 454). “[A] poem’s indeterminacy, uncertainty, and the rest make every individual reader’s reading possible. . . . Keats’s attainment of a large readership to make all this multiple interpreting possible” (Stillinger 257). “Canonical works are those texts that have gradually revealed themselves to be multi-dimensional and omni-significant, those works that have produced a plenitude of meanings and interpretations Their very indeterminacy means that they can never be exhausted . . . [and therefore] ‘permanently valuable’” (Harlan

⁵ British romantic poets “intensively questioned and redefined their relationship to society and the world”—for example, Wordsworth asserts that “A Poet is a man speaking to men” and Shelley defends poets as “the unacknowledged legislators of the world” (O’Halloran 177). They may emphasize on their lonely images, but they cannot neglect their relationships to society.

581). Such indeterminacy also characterizes ecocritical thinking itself. Næss recognizes that his proposed ideas of deep ecology "are strikingly vague and ambiguous" and consequently "open to a variety of interpretations" ("The Use of Vagueness"). He respects the dignity and freedom of the individual and he encourages people to be their own teachers (Drengson "Introduction"). It is not the elimination of the selfhood of an individual, but a denial of the individual as the ultimate authority as well as the negation of "meta-narrative." "Because of the diversity of languages, cultures, and personal experiences, it is not only possible but necessary to have great pluralism . . ." (Drengson "Introduction"). Negative capability itself requires "uncertainties," and in Keatsian poetics, beauty revealed through this capability usually contains pain and pleasure. This oxymoronic feeling also appears in Clymene's "interpretation" of Apollo's image (H. 2. 279-89). Beauty anticipates no stable, definite elucidations, but various, diverse understandings. This pluralism, also taken-for-granted in ecocriticism, is "open to a variety of interpretations."

The two versions of Hyperion stories testify to the Keats's embrace of multiplicity in his interpretations of the Titans' fall. The original "Hyperion" resembles "Paradise Lost" by Milton so remarkably—the suffering Titans in wilderness look like the fallen angels in the beginning of "Paradise Lost"—while Keats rewrites the story as a vision, "The Fall of Hyperion," and adds "much to his conception of the meaning of the story" (Robertson). Keats confesses that he gives up "Hyperion" because "there were too many Miltonic inversions in it" and he wishes to try "other sensations" ("Letter to J. H. Reynolds" 359). He yearns for multiplicity in presenting the same story: "Hyperion" emphasizes on the sufferings of the Titans in the change of the world order, whereas "The Fall of Hyperion" highlights the pain of a growing poet. Though Keats copies many lines of "Hyperion" in "The Fall," he displays a different vision in his rewriting.

C. The transformation of a poet: to "die into life"

Keats always sees Apollo as the supreme ideal of the poet. In "Ode to Apollo" (1815) he is assumed to inspire sublime poets: Homer, Virgil, Milton, Shakespeare, Spenser, and Tasso; Apollo illuminates the whole world and maintains the universal harmony. "Nature and art are one, and their voice is divine. Such ideas are central to Keats's early aspirations, to his conviction of the grandeur and power of poetry and the sacredness of the poet's vocation" (Coote 25-26). In addition, the various roles assumed by an ideal poet—a sage, a humanist, and a physician—are all patronized by Apollo, the god of medicine and poetry, and of "negative capability."

In Keats's narration, Apollo undergoes a painful transformation before his maturity, a process that also symbolizes the growth of a poet. Apollo shows his negative capability at an early stage: he has "dream'd of" Mnemosyne before meeting her (H. 3.61), and he somehow knows her name (H. 3.83); "painful vile oblivion" seals his eyes (H. 3.87)—in short, he lapses in uncertainties. Negative capability "drove him to attain a deep insight into his responsibility as a poet" and to "achieve a significant insight into the connection between creativity and self-creation" (Pfahl 460). As he begins to metamorphose,

Soon wild commotions shook him, and made flush
All the immortal fairness of his limbs;
Most like the struggle at the gate of death;
Or liker still to one who should take leave
Of pale immortal death, and with a pang
As hot as death's is chill, with fierce convulse
Die into life . . . (H. 3. 124-29)

This highlights the essence of negative capability: "reason" must die so that "imagination" and "diversity" may come to life. This death into life is an "expansionist urge to move outside the self, to unite with that which is not-self" (Clubb and Lovell 135). This death also manifest the "truth of imaginative insight" which lies "in a total abandonment of the categories of observer/observed, when the identity of the observer as thinker and the discriminator is dissolved, and consequently the distance or barrier between subject/object is collapsed . . ." (Kabitolglou 127). Apollo must "[d]ie into life"—this signifies "the ultimate negation of the poet's identity as he becomes all identities and so assumes all human pain" (Pfahl 462). Likewise, the nameless would-be poet faces the challenge from Moneta: he must either ascend the staircase or die on a marble (FH. 1.108); he experiences "[w]hat 'tis to die and live again . . ." (FH 1.142). Besides, Moneta inspires him with "uncertainties, mysteries, and doubts" as well:

. . . bright blanch'd
By an immortal sickness which kills not;
It works a constant change, which happy death
Can put no end to; deathwards progressing
To no death was that visage . . . (FH 1. 257-61)

Her image exemplifies an oxymoronic feature; with "a constant change," she teaches him to reject a fixed identity, to prepare to move "deathwards"—a movement that resembles Apollo's

death into life. He is at last transformed "[t]o see as a god sees" (FH. 1. 304). The god-like panoramic vision amounts to "gestalt" glorified by Næss.

The Hyperion poems posits the poet's awareness of death and his sense that "the experience of traumatic historical change can beget a new kind of imaginative life" (Mulrooney 251). "Death" means the loss of a fixed identity. Both Apollo and the would-be poet must "die" before gaining this "imaginative life." This demonstrates the "negative capability"—an "empty space" that rejects "the poet's authority with which Romanticism is typically associated: the poet's claims as truth-seeker/truth-teller and the authenticity of his personal experience" (Kissane 62). Keats's loss of identity is connected to negative capability in three ways: (1) it pushes him to create, (2) it enables him to create, and (3) it becomes the subject of poetry (Fitzpatrick 51). "[T]hrough loss of the self, the poet is pressured to (paradoxically) try to create a unified self"—Keats is led to confront "the function of the creative self" (Pfahl 460). In Keats's own words, the "Genius of Poetry . . . cannot be measured by law & precept, but by sensation & watchfulness in itself—That which is creative must create itself" ("Letter to J. A. Hessey" 287). His self, far from being dead or lost, resurrects and embraces various lives.

Apollo endures pain and consequently he can become an ideal sage, humanist, and physician. Alone in Nature, he "listen'd, and he wept, and his bright tears / Went trickling down the golden bow he held" (H. 3. 42-43). In other words, he sympathizes with those in sufferings, and shows the concerns about the end of poetry: "to enter into and try to heal human suffering" (O'Halloran 184). Only those who feels the pain of others can earn a place at Moneta's altar in "The Fall of Hyperion"—also a demonstration of negative capability (Pfahl 463). He strives to search for the origin of his sadness, but finally he feels numb in his limbs because of his melancholy (H. 3. 88-89). He asks for the guidance of Mnemosyne:

Point me out the way
To any one particular beauteous star,
And I will flit into it with my lyre,
And make its silvery splendor pant with bliss.(H. 3. 99-102)

This eagerness to bless the world with his lyre assumes again the image of "gestalt": his poetry must prevail and connect all beings, shining upon them like a star. This is not an egocentric declaration, because a poet as a sage/humanist/physician must serve the others, not to dominate and exploit the world for his/her own benefit. For ecocriticism, one should not see oneself "as a resource for consumption and self-assertion, but as a part of greater living identity. All human actions should be guided by a sense of what is good for the biosphere as a whole" (Clark,

Cambridge). The awareness of the others' need, featured by the new life of a poet of the negative capability, bestows meaning on the poet's existence in the "greater living identity."

A poet of the negative capability speaks to others; however, before one can assume various roles in creativity, it is necessary to "die into life"—to abandon a fixed identity and to learn to care for others. Keats endeavors to quest for beauty with the negative capability; he becomes "that which one is not," and simultaneously led him "to develop his own, original concept of poetry" (Pfahl 456). His sufferings then enable him to present the fall of the Titans all the more profoundly.

IV. The Presentation of the Fall of the Titans

A. The anti-pastoral image imposed on Nature

The fellow-feeling of Keats, a sage/humanist/physician, empowers him to depict the Titans' sufferings not found in *Theogony*. While Hesiod, aiming at "praising Zeus the aegis-holder and queenly Hera" and all the other Olympians, blames the Titans for doing "presumptuously a fearful deed" with the prediction of vengeance, Keats treats the Olympians as rebels and sympathizes with the Titans. "Hyperion" is "a veritable gallery of studies in pain" (Newey 74) and "the aestheticization of suffering (Newey 75). It also reflects Keats's anxiety and suffering (Sperry 187-93). After 1819, "[t]he sensation is like that of being confined in a dark vault at noonday" (Rossetti 21)⁶. "The supreme state of negative capability . . . qualifies the narrator to look on the tragedy of the Titans and know himself as a poet" (Coote 280). The poet-dreamer "shares the prolonged agony and bereavement of the Titans of whom he writes" (O'Halloran 180): as the would-be poet witnesses the fall of the Titans, he feels and bears their pain as his own. This feeling also stems from his negative capability, which "allows individuals to overcome selfishness and experience compassion for others" (Lau 88). Keats's presentation of Titans' sufferings hence manifests the "gestalt" picture affirmed by Næss: all creatures belong to living Nature, and no beings should be despised or disregarded.

After being defeated by the Olympians, the Titans are all driven to wilderness—heaven and earth have rejected them, and the world can no longer accept them as gods (H. 1.55-56). In traditional western thinking, on the one hand, nature or wilderness "presents itself as the best

⁶ Rossetti describes the last year of Keats's life: "he would be unable to marry the woman of his heart. While sickness kept him a prisoner, he was torn by ideas of her volatility and fickleness. Disease was sapping his vitals, pain wrung him, Death beckoned him with finger more and more imperative. Poetic fame became the vision of Tantalus, and love the clasp of Ixion" (22).

antidote to our human selves, a refuge we must somehow recover . . ." (Cronon 7). As Thoreau describes, "there is a subtle magnetism in Nature, which, if we unconsciously yield to it, will direct us aright"; "in Wildness is the preservation of the World" and "[l]ife consists with wildness" ("Walking"). Wilderness "offers us the illusion that we can escape the cares and troubles of the world in which our past has ensnared us" (Cronon 16). The presence of nature⁷, while not subdued by civilization, can refresh human beings. On the other hand, however, wilderness in western history has also long been "a place to which one came only against one's will, and always in fear and trembling" (Cronon 9). Gilgamesh must "travel a distant road" in order to "face a battle unknown" with Humbaba the monster (Foster 21). In the Book of Exodus, the Israelites are punished to wander in wilderness for forty years because of their lack of faith. The anti-pastoral "presents a harsh, unidealised picture that demythologizes ideal locations such as Eden, Arcadia and Shangri-La and shows the tensions, ruptures and inequalities inherent in rural life" (Rangarajan). Hence the existence of wilderness renders the sacredness of Nature in ambiguity. The whole picture of Nature is exalted and degraded simultaneously. "The Book of Nature" is far from being "linear, syntactically well organized, unified work" and the words always fluctuate (Morton).

Keats's *Hyperion* poems narrates the fall of the Titans: the once-privileged rulers are forced to stay in a marginalized place, "the sad spaces of oblivions" (H. 2.359), and each one is "self hid or prison bound" (H. 1.161; FH. 2.10). "Nature," represented as "wilderness," resists the stereotypical image as a benign mother and comforter, while the secluded species does not enjoy harmony and rest. Actually, this wilderness is compared to death: "where the dead leaf fell, there did it rest" (H. 1.10; FH. 1.314); "[s]carce images of life (H. 2.33). The suffering Titans do not entertain any nostalgic feelings toward wilderness or nature—therefore, it can be inferred, they never "enjoyed" this supposed "refuge" when they dominated the world. Since "Hyperion" is modelled on *Paradise Lost* by John Milton, the defeated Titans are supposedly portrayed as the fallen angels, while "wilderness" parallels hell. In short, the *Hyperion* poems generally present an anti-pastoral image of nature⁸.

⁷ Raymond Williams offers three definitions of "nature": (1) the essential character of something; (2) the "inherent force which directs the world"; (3) the material world (*Keyword* 219). In this paper I mainly refer to the last one.

⁸ Keats never aims to justify the ways of Nature to man. "The standard justifications for the protection of nature-recreation, beauty, scientific interest, stabilization of ecosystems, etc.-were all 'anthropocentric values.'... All of the anthropocentric claims for the value of nature were subjective, speculative..." (Woodhouse). Ecocriticism is expected to arouse human awareness to hold responsibility for the environment, to avoid "environmental injustice," or to change minds and lives and policy with "vision and imagination" (Buell, *Future*). Yet Keats always evades from such public responsibility. He invites readers

B. The downgrading of Titans in Nature/Wilderness

In Keats's poetry, nature usually appears as an environment for an isolated hero to quest for the Ideal, the Beauty, or the Vision. This environment neither provides comfort nor exists as the goal for the heroic quest. A hero in quest must essentially lack something, but Keats does not assume that Nature can ultimately satisfy a hero. In Hyperion poems, nature/wilderness and the Titans are both excluded by the Olympians. Enceladus, one of the Titans who have stayed in wilderness for a while, complains: "Much pain have I for more than loss of realms: / The days of peace and slumberous calm are fled" (H. 2. 334-35). The "loss of realms" means his lack of power and sovereignty. Clemene grieves in fear: "And all my knowledge is that joy is gone, / And this woe crept in among our hearts, / There to remain for ever, as I fear" (H. 2.253-55), while "horrors, portioned to a giant nerve, / Oft made Hyperion ache" (H. 1.175-76; cf. FH. 2.23-24). Long-term sufferings incur their fear, a feeling that is usually associated with the sublime⁹. Hence, the Titan's retreat to wilderness means their plunge into the realm of the sublime, the antithesis to beauty. By the eighteenth century "wilderness" as a landscape has been expressed in the concept of the sublime, which usually arouses fear and anxiety (Cronon 10). "The passion caused by the great and sublime in nature . . . is astonishment . . . with some degree of horror" while "terror is . . . the ruling principle of the sublime" (Burke). "The feeling of the sublime is therefore a feeling of pain," and nature can be treated as dynamically sublime "only so far as it is considered an object of fear" (Kant). Both nature and the Titans are expelled by the Olympians, who are regarded as "beautiful"—in this light, these two Hyperion poems implies a looming contrast between the sublime and the beautiful. The absence of most of the Olympians in both poems signifies the lack of beauty for the Titans themselves, while it seems impossible for those in the realm of the sublime to return to beauty anymore. Apollo, one of the Olympians, is still waiting for the occasion to "[d]ie into life," and strictly speaking he does not possess beauty yet. The Titans cannot find beauty in wilderness, the realm of the sublime, while they suffer because they have permanently lost their original beauty/might. As Saturn laments, "I have left / My strong identity, my real self" (H. 1.112-13), "where is Saturn?" (H. 1.134). The Titans were once beautiful as the Olympians are, and the loss of beauty also means the loss of their identity as mighty rulers.

to appreciate the beauty of Nature, without the intention to "protect" such beauty.

⁹ Keats's description of these marginalized and impotent Titans is fundamentally non-anthropocentric. The Titans' fear manifests their insignificance—and that of humanity as well, since modern interpretation always treats the Titans, the Olympians, or any other mythological characters as allegorical demonstrations of human beings. Keats describes that Saturn in sufferings "beats the human heart" (H. 1.43).

Yet "gestalt" still exists despite their loss of beauty. The anti-pastoral descriptions of Nature haunt Hyperion poems. Saturn hides himself "[d]eep in the shady sadness of a vale" (H. 1.1; FH. 1.294), so do Moneta and the would-be poet; "his bow'd head seemed list'ning to the Earth, / His ancient mother, for some comfort" (H. 1.20-21; FH. 1.325-26), a wish that is never granted. Lightning "[s]corches and burns" the Titans' domain (H. 1.62-63; FH. 1.365), while they stay in "this nest of pain" (H. 2.90). Enceladus speaks like "a roaring in the bleak-grown pines" (H. 2.116). Moneta comments that Saturn and Thea are moving to "the families of grief, / Where roof'd in by black rocks they waste, in pain / And darkness, for no hope" (FH. 1.461-63). The landscape reflects the Titans' sufferings, a reflection (or "pathetic fallacy," attacked by Ruskin) that shows one's "unexamined longings and desires" (Cronon 7). Though unfriendly to the Titans, "Nature" seems to stay with them in such a reflection, and to incorporate them in the whole picture of the bleak environment. Nature and those suffering deities are symbolically merged into One, envisioned by a poet with negative capability.

C. The interdependence of the Titans

In addition, Keats rearranges the Greco-Roman mythology and intensifies the "unification" of the Titans, a rewriting that reveals the poet's ideal as well. He admires Milton, and the meeting of the Titans actually resembles the devils' in *Paradise Lost*. Besides, in terms of the growth of his artistry, he benefited greatly in Leigh Hunt's circle, as I have pointed out earlier. The arrangement of the Titans' gathering echoes the poet's experience and longing for "company." In *Theogony*, Oceanus, Tethys, Clymene, and Themis do not participate in the war against the Olympians, but in "Hyperion" they are all assumed to have been defeated. The fall of Titans is "Keats's most insightful view of the individual human life and of collective human experience" (Gradman 120). Saturn cannot bear to suffer alone, and then he goes with Thea to the "nest of pain," the place where all the other Titans are staying, while Hyperion is supposed to join them later on. Saturn accepts responsibility for his own loss and that of other Titans—a scene which symbolizes that Keats "regains a sense of self, one to match that of a god who can create out of chaos of negativity" (Castellano 33). This is an attentiveness to coexistence, and "coexistentialism" serves as the ethics of the ecological thought (Morton). Ecology shows that "all beings are connected. The ecological thought is the thinking of interconnectedness" (Morton). Titans' sufferings are not like that of the Byronic hero, and they determine to share the same burden, a determination that ecocritics may extol as "symbiosis" (Næss, "Shallow" 96), since ecology "includes all the ways we imagine how we live together. Ecology is profoundly about coexistence. Existence is always coexistence."

No man is an island” (Morton). By describing the Titans’ “unification,” Keats portrays a gestalt picture that also exposes his own inclination.

D. The anti-anthropocentric versus the anthropocentric

However, it does not follow that the Titans reach an agreement with regard to their next step. Their debate, similar to that of the fallen angels in *Paradise Lost*, illustrates a polyphonic situation that indicates the lack of a powerful, determinate center of the Titans. It also echoes the purposive “absence” of the poet as well, a demonstration of the negative capability. Saturn asks for help (H. 2.166), and he now lacks the authority to settle down their disputes. Oceanus owes their fall to the “course of Nature’s law” (H. 2. 181) and advises Saturn to accept the status quo: “And first, as thou wast not the first of powers, / So art thou not the last; it cannot be: / Thou art not the beginning nor the end” (H. 2.188-90). Nature, not the Titans nor the Olympians, predominates the universe and preordains their fate. Oceanus, leaving his empire to Poseidon, advises Saturn to “[r]eceive the truth, and let it be your balm” (H. 2.243). As the only anti-anthropocentric voice in the debate, this pronouncement also resonates with biocentrism: “all organisms, including humans, are part of a larger biotic web or network or community whose interests must constrain or direct or govern the human interest” (Buell, *Future*). In brief, Oceanus expects to “live and to let live.” Yet the other Titans still declare their “privilege” inviolable. Enceladus shouts out an anthropocentric roar: he calls for revenge (H. 2. 316-24). He scorns Oceanus’s view (H. 2. 333) and believes in the possibility of their victory (H. 2. 341-42). It is a tragic flaw to assume this anthropocentric vision—to conquer and exploit every natural thing (Rueckert 113). Enceladus’s proposal, once put into practice, shall end in disaster. The Titans’ contradictory opinions are never settled. Their comments reiterate Saturn’s initial judgment: nothing can “unriddle” the truth of their situation as fallen Gods (Castellano 35). In “The Fall of Hyperion,” Keats does not synthesize these conflicting views, either: Moneta regards the Olympians’ action as “rebellion” (1. 224), and she does not mention the supremacy of Nature as Oceanus does, nor does she justify the necessity of the Titans’ counterattack. Undeniably, Keats’s illustration of the Titans’ conflicts highlights his dramatist-like creativity derived from negative capability. He is consistent in holding “uncertainties” and multiplicity necessary—in other words, he sticks to neither anthropocentrism nor anti-anthropocentrism.

E. Negative capability without staging ecological sustainability

This inconclusive debate among Titans manifests Keats’s negative capability—to negate the poet’s own identity in order to characterizes various individuals as a dramatist does. This

ability "enables the poet to play many emotional roles and to creates a dialog among those roles" (Pfahl 455), while "Hyperion" may be Keats's first step toward drama (Pfahl 456). This artistry as a "protean poet" is related to his practice in writing drama (Slote 131). The Keatsian poetic nature displays various figures and voices as a "chameleon" (Slote 13). He "becomes more than he is" and "his protean voices are singing" (Slote 136).

With the "protean voices," Keats never fully endorses the ideal of ecological sustainability. This ideal exists if and only if richness and diversity of life-forms are sustained (Næss, *Ecology*), and asserts "*the equal right to live and blossom*" for all beings (Næss, "Shallow" 96). The attempt to neglect mutual dependence and to establish a master-slave role leads to self-alienation (Næss, "Shallow" 96). The Olympians violate this ideal and renounce symbiosis with the Titans by overthrowing and driving them to wilderness, yet Keats merely regards this as the course of natural law: "Fate / Had pour'd a mortal oil upon his head" (H. 2.96-97), and his revision of "Hyperion" as "The Fall of Hyperion" testifies to his preference to a deterministic worldview. The rejection of symbiosis confirms the Olympians as the sovereignty on the one hand, and their action (despite their absence in both Hyperion poems) as anthropocentric on the other hand. Nature merely predestines the Titans to be replaced by the Olympians, and therefore abandons biodiversity and environmental sustainability, while the necessity of gestalt is threatened as well. In other words, Keats's deterministic assumption of natural law contradicts the ideal of gestalt praised by ecocritics. With "uncertainties," he does not fully support ecocriticism in Hyperion poems.

In the presentation of the Titans' sufferings, Keats' poetic self appears in casting his own fear and anxiety on those deities and his rewriting of Greek mythology, while gestalt arises in his depiction of the Titans' gathering. Yet his negative capability, prevailing with the "protean voices," does not promote "*the equal right to live and blossom*" for all beings. Without ecological sustainability, all forms of relationships cannot endure, and gestalt will always be threatened to collapse. Both the rise of the Olympians and the fall of the Titans are owed to the exercise of the indifferent natural law. Although Oceanus rejects anthropocentrism by recognizing the supremacy of nature and the necessity of their acceptance of their status quo, he shows no concern for "ecological sustainability," a significant biocentric ideal—not to mention the other Titans or the Olympians. Nature in Keats's Hyperion poems—far from being a comfort, a tender mother, or a helper to all hopeless and helpless Titans—only favors those predestined to rule. Perhaps with the negative capability a sage/humanist/physician fails to achieve "ecological sustainability," a *certain* goal that resists "uncertainties, mysteries, and doubts." His "indefiniteness of literary aim," nevertheless, is owed to his endeavor to

experiment with various topics and styles, an endeavor not “derogatory to the author” (Rossetti 85). It is a pity that “the best work in Romantic ecocriticism is not obviously ecocritical . . .” (Nersessian 2). Perhaps negative capability prevents Keats from assuming himself as a purely eco-friendly poet.

V. Conclusion

“Gestalt” always presupposes a context, while “self” gains meanings only in a context. The context in Keats’s *Hyperion* poems can be human emotions, society, or nature. Negative capability represents the presence of Keats’s poetic self; moreover, it brings forward “gestalt.” As he negates his own identity and praises beauty as “might,” Keats perceives beauty as combining pleasure and pain, and therefore his poetic self becomes all the more remarkable—the “Keatsian” taste of beauty differs from those of many other critics. His “gestalt” understanding of human emotions accompanies his exhibition of his unique taste. As he defines his identity as a sage/humanist/physician, he presumes his connection with the others in an environment in which all beings should coexist peacefully. As he delineates the suffering Titans, he rewrites Greek mythology and the Titans are arranged to stay together to share their burden. Therefore, both “gestalt” and his self emerge in his presentations of beauty, of a poet’s identity, and of the Titans’ fall. Although gestalt exalts the “whole” above the “part” in importance, and Keats also negates the identity of a poet, his own peculiar self is still clearly revealed with the exertion of his negative capability. Since negative capability always avoids all forms of certainty and rationality, self-expression and gestalt neither reach synthesis nor cross out each other, but both cooperate perfectly in Keats’s artistry.

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